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the computation of credit for served, 
because he is entitled to credit for all the time served. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On January 3, 2007, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Martin had 
committed one count of burglary, felony, in violation Idaho Code § 18-1401, one 
count of petit theft, misdemeanor, in violation of LC.§§ 18-2403(1) and 18-2407(2), one 
count of malicious injury to property, in violation of LC. § 18-7001, one count of 
malicious injury to property, misdemeanor, in violation of I C. § 18-7001, and one count 
of unlawful entry, misdemeanor, in violation of LC. § 18-7034. , pp.7-10.) 1 The 
counts stemmed from an alleged incident a property in Cascade. (See R., pp.8-10.) 
At the time the complaint was filed, Mr. Martin was incarcerated in the custody of the 
Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) on another case. (See R., pp.106, 114-15.) 
On February 16, 2007, Mr. Martin was served with a detainer and warrant in this 
case while he was in prison. (R., pp 114-20.) About a month later, Mr. Martin filed, pro 
se, a "Motion and Demand of Speedy , requesting a speedy trial under LC § 19-
3504. (R., pp.13-14.) The district court did not act on that motion. (See R., p.106.) 
1 All page cites to "R." refer to the 153-page PDF electronic version of the Clerk's 
Record on Appeal. Please note the electronic version of the record does not include 
pagination outside that provided by the PDF reader program. 
2 The record does not clearly state the identity of the other case, but the district court 
ultimately ordered that the sentence in this case run concurrently "with all other cases 
including Gem County Case No. CR06-2317." (See R., p.96.) 
1 
five Martin filed, 
1 
on se 
a a public defender 
se 
1 1, 106.) 
On or around August 16, 2009, Mr. Martin was paroled in the other case. (See 
, p.106.) On August 18, 2009, in this case, Mr. Martin was released on his own 
recognizance. (See R., pp.33-35, 106; see also R., p.15 (Statement of Defendant's 
Rights in a Felony Case), p 16 (Order Appointing Public Defender and Order for 
Discovery).) Mr. Martin then waived his preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound 
him over to the district court. (See R., p.36.) The State filed an Information charging 
him with felony burglary, misdemeanor petit theft, felony malicious injury to property, 
misdemeanor injury to property, and misdemeanor unlawful entry. (R., pp.37-40.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Martin pleaded guilty to felony burglary, and 
the State agreed to dismiss the other counts. (R., pp.41-43, 45-51, 106.) However, 
Mr. Martin did not appear at his scheduled sentencing hearing, because he had been 
arrested on a parole violation in the other case and was in IDOC custody. (See 
R., pp.52, 106.) The district court later indicated the parole violation was for attempting 
to associate with females. (See R., p.70.) 
On December 23, 2009, Mr. Martin was served with another detainer and warrant 
in this case while in prison on the parole violation. (R., pp.121-24.) On October 4, 
2012, Mr. Martin filed, pro se, a "Motion for Transport and [Schedule] Court Date," 
requesting that he be transferred from IDOC custody to Valley County to finish 
sentencing in this case. (R., pp.53-55.) Later that month, he wrote a letter to the district 
court clerk inquiring as to the progress on this case. (R., p.56.) It does not appear the 




term of six years, with one year fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.69-71, 
The district court indicated the sentence was shorter than it could have been 
because the credit for time served to which Mr. Martin was entitled was unclear. ( See 
R., pp. 70-71.) The district court stated in Judgment of Conviction and Sentence that 
"[f]or record purposes only, the defendant is entitled to credit for fifty-one (51 )-days 
served as of the 28th day of February, 2013." (R., p.76.) 
Mr. Martin subsequently filed, pro se, a "Relinquish of Rider" motion, requesting 
his "rider" be terminated and jurisdiction relinquished. (See R., pp.80-81.) The district 
court then relinquished jurisdiction and executed the sentence on June 27, 2013. 
(R., pp.84-86, 88-90.) The district court reserved jurisdiction to determine Mr. Martin's 
credit for time served. (R., p.89.) Almost a year later, the district court determined 
Mr. Martin "shall receive credit for one hundred seventy (170) days served as of 
June 27th, 2013. (R., pp.96-98.) 
About two months after the district court's credit determination. Mr. Martin filed a 
Rule 35 Motion to Reduce and/or Correct Sentence. (R., pp.105-10.) Mr. Martin 
asserted he "is entitled to credit for time served from February 16, 2007, the date the 
original warrant was served on him, until August 18, 2009, the date he was released on 
that warrant." (R., p.107.) Mr. Martin also asserted he "is entitled to credit for time 
served from December 23, 2009, the date the second warrant was served on him, to 
June 27, 2013, the date of the final sentencing." (R., p.107.) He asserted he "is entitled 
to credit for a total of approximately 2,204 days." (R., p.107.) 
3 
was "incarcerated on both warrants" in this case while in 
1 was 
on was ineligible 
release. (R., pp.107-08; see R., pp.125.) Mr. Martin further asserted not giving him the 
requested credit would "set[] a precedent and incentive for the State to decline to 
transport individuals at IDOC to answer charges in a timely manner." (R., p.108.) 
Conversely, granting the requested credit for time served would send "a clear message 
that encourages prompt resolution of criminal matters." (R., p.109.) Thus, Mr. Martin 
requested "that the Court correct his Judgment to reflect credit for 2,204 days served. 
,p.109.) 
The district court then entered an Order Denying Rule 35 Motion.3 (R., pp.126-
31.) The district court stated the original grant of 51 days credit for time served was for 
"stints in custody from August 14 to 18 of 2009 and January 14 to February 28 of 2013." 
(R., p.126.) The district court also stated it had "acknowledged uncertainty about how to 
calculate Martin's accumulated credit for time served," and "appear[ed] to have resolved 
the uncertainty against Martin but told Martin the sentence handed down was much 
lighter as a result." (R., p.126.) According to the district court, the later grant of 170 
days credit for time served "included 119 days more credit for time served than had 
been awarded when the rider sentence was pronounced on February 28, 2013. Not 
coincidentally, 119 days had passed from the day after the rider sentence was 
pronounced through the day jurisdiction was relinquished [June 27, 2013]." (R., p.127.) 
3 By this time, a new district judge was presiding over Mr. Martin's case. (See 
R., pp.126-27, 130.) 
4 
in one case en 
case was 
incarceration simply was not a consequence of or attributable the 
case." (R, p.128 (citing State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68 App. 2005); 
State v. Hom, 124 Idaho 849, 850-51 (Ct App. 1993).) The district court noted 
Martin had not discussed Vasquez or Hom. (R, p.128.) 
The district court then determined Mr. Martin's incarceration between February 
16, 2007 and August 2009 "was not a consequence of or attributable to this case, so he 
is not entitled to credit in this case for that incarceration." (R, p.128.) The district court 
also determined Mr. Martin's incarceration from the point of his parole-violation arrest 
[before November 23, 2009] to the time transport to Valley County in January 2013 
was not a consequence of or attributable to this case . . he was out on bond in this 
case when he was arrested on the parole violation." (R, p.129.) Thus, Mr. Martin was 
entitled to credit in this case for that incarceration either." (R, p.129.) 
The district court determined Mr. Martin's assertion his parole eligibility was 
adversely affected by the pendency of this case did not affect its conclusion, because 
his evidence was insufficient to establish he would have been released on parole a 
second time, or when he would have been released. (R, p.129.) Even assuming this 
case adversely affected Mr. Martin's parole eligibility, the district court determined he 
was still incarcerated in the case or cases in which he had violated his parole 
conditions, not in this case. (R, p.129.) 
Further, the district court rejected Mr. Martin's policy arguments. (R, p.129.) 
The district court stated it had to decide the Rule 35 motion based on LC. § 18-309 as 
5 
than (R., 129.) 
in 
case as an 
case or cases. 
the district court denied the Rule 35 motion. (R., p.130.) 
1 
Mr. Martin filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order Denying 





Mr. Martin asserts the district court erred when it denied his Rule 35 motion to 
correct the computation of credit for time served, because he is entitled to credit for all 
the time served. Idaho Code § 18-309 provides "the person against whom the judgment 
was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to 
entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for 
which the judgment was entered." I.C. § 18-309(1 ). Mr. Martin served prejudgment 
time from service of the first warrant in this case from February 16, 2007 to August 18, 
2009, and from service of the second warrant from December 23, 2009 to June 27, 
2013. (See, e.g., R., p.107.) Combined, he served a total of 2,204 days. (See 
R., pp.107, 109.) 
As the district court explained, it only gave Mr. Martin credit for the time he 
served between August 14 and August 18 of 2009, and between January 14 and June 
27 of 2013, a total of 170 days. (See R., pp.126-27.) However, under the plain 
language of Section 18-309, Mr. Martin is entitled to credit for all the time served in 
this case. Thus, the district court erred when it denied his Rule 35 motion to correct the 
computation of credit for time served. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a district court properly applied the law governing credit for time served 
to the facts is a question of law over which appellate courts exercise free review. 
State v. Brashier, 130 Idaho 112, 113 (Ct. App. 1997). Similarly, statutory interpretation 
8 
is over free 
All The Time Served 
Mr. Martin asserts that, under the plain language of LC. § 18-309, he is entitled to 
credit for the time served in this case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held the interpretation of a statute "must beg in 
with the literal words of the statute; those words must given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not 
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." 
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 893 (2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The Verska Court further held "that where statutory language is 
unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted 
for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the 
power to correct it is legislative, not judicial" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, "[a] motion to correct a court's computation of 
credit for time served, granted pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-309 or 19-2603, 
may be made at any time." I.C.R. 35(c). Idaho Code § 18-309 provides, in 
relevant part: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the 
judgment was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for any period 
of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the 
offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The 
remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of sentence 
and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is 
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned 
9 
which he was large must not as 
The Idaho Appeals held that "[t]he statute's phrase such 
incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was 
means that the right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment incarceration 
is a consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the sentence is 
imposed '" State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 68 (Ct App. 2005) (citing State v. Horn, 
124 Idaho 849, 850 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765 (Ct. App. 1989)) 
(emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals in Vasquez continued. "Thus, there must 
a causal effect between the offense and the incarceration in order for the 
incarceration to be 'for' the offense, as the term is used in I. C. § 18-309 " Id. 
Under this "causation test," the Court of Appeals has held defendants who are 
served with an arrest warrant from one county, while already serving time in a second 
county on unrelated charges, are not entitled to credit on the first county's sentence for 
prejudgment time served in the second county. See Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 68-69; 
Horn, 124 Idaho at 850-51. The Court of Appeals has reasoned that because such 
defendants were already serving time in the second county when they were served with 
the arrest warrant from the first county, the first county charges had no effect on the 
defendants' liberty because they were already subject to confinement for charges 
arising in the second county. See Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 68-69; Hom, 124 Idaho at 
850-51. 
The Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 
P.3d 30 (2015), casts doubt on the Court of Appeals' causation test In Owens, the 
Court held "Idaho Code section 18-309's language unambiguously requires courts to 
10 
a on Owens, 1 
different offenses of issuing a check without funds "gets credit for the prejudgment 
time he served on each of the eight separate offenses." Id. at_, 343 P.3d at 33. 
The Owens Court held "Idaho Code section 18-309's plain language 
unambiguously states that a defendant receives credit for time served on each of his 
offenses, whether to be served concurrently or consecutively." Id. at_, 343 P.3d at 
33. Court overruled State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 (1981 ), which had decided a 
defendant does not get credit for time served on each of the offenses where the 
sentences were to be served consecutively, because Hoch "incorrectly relied on an 
assumed legislative intent that conflicts with the statute's plain language." Id. at 
343 P.3d at 34-35. 
The holding in Owens relied the plain language of Section 18-309. the 
Court observed the statute's "language plainly gives credit for prejudgment time in 
custody against each count's sentence The statute does not limit that credit in any 
way." Id. at _, 343 P.3d at 33. Section 18-309 "mandates that a court gives a 
defendant credit for his time served because the statute states that a person 'shall' 
receive credit" Id. at _, 343 P.3d at 33. The Court also stressed the statute 
''specifies that a person 'shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of 
incarceration prior to entry of judgment . . " Id. at , 343 P.3d at 33 (emphasis in 
original). The Court then explained: 
The statute continues to provide that a defendant gets the credit only on a 
requirement that incarceration was for "the offense or an included offense 
for which the judgment was entered. The statute has a mandatory 
directive that specifically conditions credit for time served on the fact that 
11 
which the judgment was entered. 
phrase such incarceration was 
which judgment was entered" 
a gets 
as long as the prejudgment jail time was 
'the offense' defendant was convicted of and sentenced for, the 
court gives the defendant that credit. If the legislature had delineated 
credit for incarceration for 'each case' or another description other than 
'the offense,' the outcome would be different 
Id. at_, 343 P.3d at 33. 
The Owens decision's emphasis on the plain language of Section 18-309 casts 
doubt on the Court of Appeals' causation test because that test has read additional 
language into the statute. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because the 
incarcerations in Vasquez and Horn were a consequence of unrelated charges, the 
defendants in those cases did not get credit for time served in the cases on appeal. 
See Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 68-69; Horn, 124 Idaho at 850-51. Although arrest warrants 
had been served in those cases while the defendants were incarcerated, they had no 
effect on the defendants' liberty because they were already subject to confinement on 
unrelated charges. See Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 68-69; Horn, 124 Idaho at 850-51. 
Court in Vasquez further determined that ''[w]hen charges are concurrently filed, the 
prejudgment incarceration is caused by each charge," while "when the charges are ... 
brought by different complaints for unrelated charges in separate counties, the 
incarceration is not a consequence of all charges .... " Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 69 
(emphasis in original). Thus, the Court of Appeals has determined a defendant would 
get credit for prejudgment time served if the incarceration was only for the offense or an 
included offense for which the judgment was entered. 
However, the plain language of Section 18-309 does not contain a restriction that 









the defendant's liberty, considering that if one of the eight counts had been dismissed, 
the defendant would have been subject to confinement for the other counts. But under 
the plain language of Section 18-309, the defendant would still receive credit for time 
served on each of the offenses. See id. _, 343 P.3d at 33-35. Put otherwise, the 
plain language of Section 18-309 grants defendants credit for prejudgment time served 
on each offense, even if the prejudgment time served was a consequence of multiple 
offenses. The statue does not restrict credit for time served to situations where the 
incarceration was only for the offense which the judgment was entered. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals' causation test has read language into Section 18-
309 that a defendant would get credit for prejudgment time served if the incarceration 
was only for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. 
The courts do not have the authority to so revise unambiguous statutory language. 
See, e.g., Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 ("If the statute as written is socially or otherwise 
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial. . . If the statute is not 
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The Owens Court's emphasis on the plain 
language of Section 18-309 has therefore cast doubt on the Court of Appeals' 
causation test. 
The Owens decision also casts doubt on the Court of Appeals' causation test 
because the Court explained Section 18-309 ties prejudgment credit to each offense, 
not each case. The Court of Appeals has not granted credit for time served where the 
13 
was already incarcerated on unrelated in cases. 
68-69; 1 1 Owens 
1 a 
prejudgment jail time served if it was "for the offense" the defendant was convicted of 
and sentenced for. See Owens, 158 Idaho at _, 343 P.3d at 33. The Court noted, 
"fi]f the legislature had delineated credit for incarceration for 'each case' or another 
description other than 'the offense,' the outcome would be different." Id. at _, 343 
P.3d at 33. 
The Court of Appeals' causation test in effect delineates credit for incarceration 
for "each case"; a defendant would not get credit for time served in a case if he were 
already incarcerated in a different case. See Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 68-69; Horn, 124 
Idaho at 850-51. But in the Owens decision, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated that 
would be contrary to the plain language of Section 18-309. See Owens, 158 
Idaho at_, 343 P.3d at 33. Thus, has cast doubt on the Court of Appeals' 
causation test. 
Under the plain language of Section 18-309, Mr. Martin should have received the 
credit he requested for all the time served. The defendant in Owens received credit for 
time served on each of his offenses, even though the period of prejudgment 
incarceration was a consequence of multiple offenses (namely, each of the eight 
counts). See Owens, 158 Idaho at_, 343 P.3d at 33-35. Similarly, Mr. Martin is 
entitled to credit for time served following service of the warrants for the offense in the 
instant case, even though the periods of prejudgment incarceration were a 
consequence of multiple offenses (namely, the instant offense and the other 
14 
See I § 18-309(1). Once warrants were on 
in case. See 
is time 
even though he was incarcerated for multiple offenses in multiple cases, unlike the 
defendant in Owens who was incarcerated for multiple offenses in a single case. Cf. 
Owens, 158 Idaho at _, 343 P.3d at 33-35. Despite the Court of Appeals' 
determination in Vasquez, see 142 Idaho at 69, the plain language of Section 18-309 
does not distinguish between those two situations. As the Owens Court explained, 
credit for time served is tied to each offense, not delineated for each case. See Owens, 
158 Idaho at_, 343 P.3d at 33. Thus, the plain language of Section 18-309 grants 
Mr. Martin credit for prejudgment time served on each offense, even if the prejudgment 
time served was a consequence of multiple offenses in multiple cases. See I.C. § 18-
309(1 ); Owens, 158 Idaho at_, 343 P.3d at 33-35. 
Mr. Martin is entitled to credit for all the time served in this case, a total of 2,204 
days. Thus, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Martin's Rule 35 motion to 
correct the computation of credit for time served. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Martin respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
order denying his Rule 35 motion and remand the case for the district court to correct 
the computation of credit for time served and give Mr. Martin credit for a total of 2,204 
days served. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 2015. 
BEN P. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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